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ABSTRACT: In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of
determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is,
those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties,
rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. (1) Rawls' method of adopting the
"original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods.
A just society would also have the need (unmet in the above work) to
determine how the victims of injustice ought to be compensated, since history
suggests that social contracts are likely to be violated. This paper is an attempt
to determine the remedial measures that would be selected using Rawls'
method. I contend that only two of the three most widely used "affirmative
action" policies would be selected from the original position. I also sketch
another compensatory policy that would pass Rawls' fairness test.
I.
Affirmative action is public policy designed to compensate the victims of injustice. (2) To
be thus disadvantaged, in Rawls' scheme of things, is to have suffered in some way from
having had less than one's fair share of the primary goods (62). This measure, according to
Rawls, ought to be determined by the two principles that would be selected in the original
position (17-22). The "first principle," which is "lexically prior" to the second, dictates that
each member of society be granted every shareable personal liberty, a liberty being
shareable just in case one's exercising of it would not prevent others from doing so (60-1,
250). The "second principle" states that the other primary goods are to be distributed in an
egalitarian fashion unless an unequal distribution would leave everyone with more of these
goods than they would otherwise have. In addition, it mandates that every advantage is to
be the reward of holding a position for which all members of society have the opportunity
to compete (60-1, 84, 302-3). (In what follows, this caveat will prove critical.)
I shall construe the goal of affirmative action policies in Rawls' terms. Thus, they are to be
understood as being designed to secure for those who were harmed by a violation of either
one of the above principles the measure of primary goods to which those principles entitle
them as well as a remedy for the effects of their deprivation. They, then, require us not only
to change current distributional practices so as to make them fair, but also to help those
disadvantaged by past injustices become capable of utilizing the assets such a change
would bring their way.
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One way of achieving this goal is to mandate that the administrators of educational,
governmental, and business institutions employ aggressive means of recruiting the victims
of injustice. This practice, hereafter "AA1," is supposed to insure that such persons, who
might otherwise be ignorant of the academic and employment opportunities thereby
offered, are made aware of their existence and encouraged to take advantage of them.
The second form of affirmative action dictates that a member of a disadvantaged group be
given a sought after position in the event that she is as qualified for it as other aspirants.
The idea here is to compensate a victim of injustice by having her disadvantaged status
serve as a "tie-breaker." The justification typically offered for this policy, hereafter "AA2,"
is that any victim of injustice who 'holds her own' against those who possess their fair share
of the primary goods would, ceteris paribus, be better qualified had her victimization not
occurred. Such a person, it seems reasonable to suppose, would have outdone her rivals but
for her disadvantage, this having kept her from more fully realizing her potential. (There
are those who question this assumption, maintaining that in these matters one can only
speculate as to how things would have played out counterfactually. Yet it seems hard to
imagine what a disadvantage would be here if not something that causes an individual to do
less well in comparison to her peers than she could have but for...?)
Finally, there is the version of affirmative action that allows the use of college admission
and hiring "quotas." This practice, hereafter "AA3," would provide redress to the members
of disadvantaged groups by setting aside for them a fixed number of "coveted" positions
(these being the positions such as that of a university student or a partner in a prestigious
law firm, to which the advantages allowed by the second principle are affixed). Included
here are also policies, which in lieu of set asides (which are currently illegal) place the
victims of injustice at a competitive advantage over other aspirants to these positions,
allowing them to be filled by individuals whose qualifications are not higher than or equal
to those of their rivals. AA2 is meritocratic AA3 is not.
Turning to Rawls' method, to adopt the original position is to place oneself behind a "veil
of ignorance": it is to discount one's particular needs, interests, abilities, gender, race,
religion, and socioeconomic status- in short, personal characteristics that are not shared by
all others. One may regard oneself only as an arbitrary member of the society whose
distributive principles are to be determined. Thus, in selecting distributive principles from
the original position, one is not allowed to employ considerations the recognition of which
would tend to make one partial towards those who share some or all of one's personal
characteristics. The veil of ignorance prevents bias from influencing one's decision making
(12). That is not to say that self-interest will not play a role. It will be limited, however, as
follows.
Adopting the original position, Rawls argues, guarantees the selection of "fair" distributive
principles (12-13, 17-19). It does so by compelling one to opt for principles whose
application would provide each member of one's society with enough of the primary goods
to realize her "plan or life." Being "ignorant" to which groups one belongs, one would not,
as the rational agent Rawls presumes one to be, select principles whose application would
leave some members of one's society disadvantaged. For to do so would be to put oneself at
risk of being unable to realize one's goals, a risk to which a rational agent would be averse:
for all one knows behind the veil, one may be a member of any disadvantaged group one
could form. Self-interest would thus dictate that one not form such a group, mandating
instead that one secure for each member of society enough of the primary goods to realize
her plan of life. A just distributive principle, according to Rawls, is such that a rational
agent would choose it if the operation of his self-interest were limited in this manner, i.e., if
she were being fair.
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As noted above, Rawls believes that in the original position a rational agent would choose
the first and second principles of justice. He leaves unanswered, however, the question of
how to make amends to the victims of injustice (145). Foreseeing the possibility of the
above principles being breached, I propose to answer this question by choosing, from
behind the veil of ignorance, principles of compensatory justice. I begin by determining
whether or not AA1-3 would be acceptable from this perspective.
II.
Would AA1 pass Rawls' fairness test? To answer this question, it must be determined
whether or not AA1's application would have an unfair "downside." Staying within Rawls'
system, I shall stipulate that the employment of a principle of compensatory justice would
have an unfair downside (that is, expected consequences that would warrant the principle's
rejection in the original position) just in case it would involve the violation of either one of
the original distributive principles. In choosing principles of remedial justice, the first and
second principles of justice are to act as constraints, besides those imposed by the veil of
ignorance, on what measures may be chosen. (Though it turns out below that it is the
second principle that is most germane to the matter being considered, the first principle and
the veil of ignorance still play roles here, the former functioning to protect liberties the
latter to insure that no one disadvantaged group is favored over another.) This proviso is in
keeping with Rawls' assumption that those adopting the original position are committed to
upholding the terms of whatever agreement is thereby reached (145).
There are parties to the current debate over affirmative action who might challenge this
stipulation, maintaining that those who gained from discrimination before the principles
were in place should expect to suffer a measure of injustice until their victims have been
fully compensated. Whence comes the obligation to be fair to such persons (or their
beneficiaries), especially if respecting their rights stands in the way of redressing those
whose rights they have disregared? But while fairness surely dictates that the beneficiaries
of injustice abdicate their ill-gotten gains, it does not require additional sacrifices on their
part. In particular, it does not require that they forfeit any rights others possess. To expect
them to do so, is only to invite further claims of injustice, preventing the establishment
once and for all of a 'level playing field'. The process of selecting principles of justice is
rendered pointless unless it is assumed that its outcome will lead to as much.
To the objection that the issue of remedial justice belongs to "nonideal" theory (245-6) and
is thus not to be settled by appeal to the first and second principles, I would respond that
"strict compliance" or "ideal" theory does establish limits to what can be done by way of
compensatory policies. It seems to me that the principles selected in the original position
are not be violated unless it can shown that their suspension is entailed by the only effective
means of redressing injustice, which, as will be demonstrated, is not the case. Taking them
seriously would appear to require acknowledging that even those who may be the
beneficiaries of injustice have rights that must be respected. Surely there is a high burden
of proof that is to be met before it is warranted to fight injustice with injustice. Rawls'
remark that the principles of justice are "generally relevant," (246) at least suggests such
conservativism.
Our reluctance to breach the principles we had established would be bolstered by the
realization that it may be very difficult to single out those whose talents, abilities, and
qualifications are the by-products of injustice. While a case might be made for requiring
extraordinary sacrifices of such persons, it is just not obvious in many instances where
natural advantages end and those that stem from wealth and privilege begin. Can we say,
e.g., that Wittgenstein would not have become a great philosopher but for his father's
exploitation of his workers? Conversely, while it seems plausible to assume, as below, that
rough equals would have been distinguishable had one of them not been harmed by 3
injustice, it is a stretch to suppose a lesser qualified candidate would have outdone her
rivals but for her disadvantaged background. Without being able to draw sharp lines here,
we run the risk of harming persons who have not profited from injustice and making
amends to those who are not really its victims. Better then to be certain that all other
compensatory policies are inadequate before nullifying our original contract. (3)
The question, then, we must ask of a proposed means of redressing injustice is: would it
lead to some members of society being deprived of the measure of primary goods to which
they are entitled according to the first and second principles of justice?
With respect to AA1, the answer to this question is no. Here one must be wary of violating
the second principle's provision regarding "fair equality of opportunity" (84). But the
aggressive recruiting mandated by AA1 would not entail that there be fewer coveted
positions open to some persons than there are to others. It would simply bring into the field
of competition individuals who would otherwise be left out. (I am assuming that the
positions in question are existing ones and not ad hoc openings tailored exclusively to
disadvantaged candidates. The creation of such positions falls under AA3.) Thus, assuming
that AA1 would not breach other provisions of the two basic principles- that is, would not
lead to inequalities in the distribution of personal liberties or the other primary goods (it
being presumed that those who are not from disadvantaged groups are already aware of the
opportunity to compete for existing coveted positions)- it would be acceptable to someone
in the original position.
Jan Narveson raises the following objection to this conclusion. (4) It follows from a general
concern over the measure of primary goods to which each member of a Rawlsian society is
entitled. Narveson presents the defender of Rawls with a dilemma, the upshot of which is
that we owe each other nothing but liberty, so that a victim of injustice is, at most, entitled
to lost wages. Requiring employers to aggressively recruit the victims of injustice would
unjustifiably infringe upon the formers' economic liberty.
The first horn is that, given the lexical ordering of the principles, there is no case in which
applying the second principle is justified. (5) If we take seriously Rawls' stricture that liberty
"can be restricted only for the sake of liberty," then it seems that assistance to the
disadvantaged must not entail depriving someone of an opportunity of becoming wealthier,
e.g., by disallowing, in the name of AA1, an employer's foregoing of a costly search for
disadvantaged job candidates. The absolute priority of the first principle appears to make it
impossible to promote equality by invoking the second.
Narveson realizes that a Rawlsian can evade this horn by pointing out that the first
principle covers only the sort of liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights. (6) It is not
intended to apply to one's business dealings. But even if such activities did fall under the
first principle's scope, the practices that Narveson mentions would not thereby be protected.
The liberties they entail are not shareable: allowing employers to hire whomever they
please licenses them to confine the members of a racial minority, say, to low-paying jobs,
thus preventing them from becoming employers themselves. The first principle would
place restrictions upon hiring practices.
The second horn, according to Narveson, is inescapable. There is no way to justify
inequalities as beneficial to the least advantaged, as Rawls attempts to do with the
difference principle. That many persons will not perform a demanding job without being
given a higher salary than others, does not warrant having inequalities. It only "excuses"
them. The difference principle cannot be used to license economic incentives involving
inequalities. Rawls is left with the strict egalitarianism he sought to avoid. (7)
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The Rawlsian may respond, however, that it is not the individual's taking of a higher salary
that the difference principle is supposed to justify. Rather, it is the practice of employing
incentives involving inequalities, given the inherent selfishness of persons. A society is
warranted in granting higher salaries, given its members lack of altruism; though said
members are themselves unjustified in failing to act for the 'common good'. Thus, Rawls is
not compelled to jettison one or the other of his principles. Pace Narveson, his system
allows for a 'tempered' inegalitarianism according to which remedial justice may come at
the expense of economic liberty.
A caveat is in order here. The recruiting mandated by AA1 must be directed at the actual
victims of injustice and not all and only the members of that group or groups a signifigant
portion of whose members have been treated unfairly. The common features of the
members of such groups should serve only as a means of identifying potential candidates
for redress, with the facts of personal history ultimately deciding the issue. Moreover, we
would need to look beyond these groups to find other individuals to whom AA1 (or any
other just remedial measure) ought to be applied. It is the effects of injustice on one's own
life, not the lives of those with whom one may categorized, that determines the extent to
which one is entitled to the provisions of any compensatory policy.
Does AA2 also comply with Rawl's principles? Behind the veil of ignorance, one would
reason as follows: "If I were someone against whose interests AA2 had operated, I would
not thereby have been deprived of my fair share of the primary goods. For I would not have
been prevented from competing for the position I'd failed to attain. My failure would be
determined by my inability to outdo another aspirant who would have outperformed me
had she not been disadvantaged. (I am assuming that the individual in question is
disadvantaged and not merely the member of a group most of whose members are
disadvantaged, and that I myself am not a victim of injustice despite belonging to a group
in which this is not the norm.) I would not have 'lost out' to someone to whom I was
superior according to the operative criteria. If I had, I would have grounds for a just
complaint, as, in effect, there would have been fewer coveted positions open to me than
others. But that was not the case. Moreover, I would have suffered neither a loss of freedom
nor of any other primary good." Thus, AA2 would also be acceptable to someone in the
original position.
It should be emphasized that the scoring of candidates must be based on publicly known,
objective criteria and subject to review. Ties should neither be manufactured nor ignored.
The potential for abuse must be acknowledged. But it warrants safeguards and vigilance,
not abandoning the policy. (The same should be said in response to the citing of the
possible misuses of AA1.) Moreover, the supposed value of diversity in institutions plays
no role in justifying either AA1 or AA2. The self-interested parties in the original position
are only concerned with mitigating the effects of injustice on its individual victims. As with
the application of AA1, cases are meant to be decided on the merits of the aspirants
involved, thus forestalling the morally offensive possibility of a candidate being rejected
for reasons having nothing to do with her qualifications.
By now it should be obvious why someone in the original position would reject AA3: its
application would lead to inequality of opportunity. Under AA3, victims of injustice would
be allowed to compete for the positions that are set aside for them as well as those open to
all aspirants; other members of society would be permitted to compete only for the latter
positions.
Unlike AA1, which is intended only to make all qualified persons aware of existing
opportunities, AA3 involves excluding certain individuals from the competition for some
of those benefits. In contrast to AA2, according to which one's disadvantaged status can
serve as a tie breaker, AA3 would allow the victims of injustice to forego having to 5
compete against all aspirants to certain coveted positions. Such a remedial measure would,
thus, have an unjust downside and therefore be rejected by someone in the original
position.
It would be rejected even if its application was expected to comply with the second
principle's provision that all inequalities lead to an improvement in the standard of living of
each member of society. Certainly it is in the best interest of each member of a society that
the victims of its injustice be compensated, if for no other reason than that it lessens the
chance of civil unrest. And behind the veil of ignorance, one would have, as indicated
above, a conclusive reason for providing for their redress. But the second principle also
places a limit upon what may be done in this regard: no one is to be left with fewer
opportunities than others; inequality of opportunity is to be rectified by allowing its victims
to now compete for any of the positions from which they had formerly been excluded, not
by granting such persons opportunities not available to others. That applying AA3 would,
in effect, replicate the very inequality it is supposed to remedy, thus, warrants disregarding
the fact that it would redress victims of injustice as well as improve, in some respects, the
lot of everyone else. Rawls suggests as much in the following passage:
First, though, I should note that the reasons for requiring open positions are not
solely, or even primarily, those of efficiency. I have not maintained that offices
must be open if in fact everyone is to benefit from an arrangement. For it may
be possible to improve everyone's situation by assigning certain powers and
benefits to positions despite the fact that certain groups are excluded from
them. Although access is restricted, perhaps these offices can still attract
superior talent and encourage better performance. But the principle of open
positions forbids this. It expresses the conviction that if some places were not
open on a basis fair to all, those kept out would be right in feeling unjustly
treated even though they benefited from the greater efforts of those who were
allowed to hold them. They would be justified in their complaint not only
because they were excluded from certain external rewards of office such as
wealth and privilege, but because they were debarred from experiencing the
realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of social
duties. They would be deprived of one of the main forms of human good (84).
In a Rawlsian society, compensatory justice would not be effected by requiring some
members to sacrifice important elements of personal fulfillment, only one of which, it
should be noted, is financial.
Thomas Nagel misses this later point in defending AA3. He argues that it is "probably" not
unjust, since it remedies a "grave social evil" and is only a temporary deviation from a
"meritocratic system" that is itself morally indefensible. (8) Moreover, the sacrifices
required of its victims are not so great, given that they retain the "general social
dominance" out of which a situation requiring affirmative action arose.
While I for one agree with Nagel that the economic advantages generated by meritocracy
are without moral justification, the complaints of AA3's victims do not stem solely from
financial concerns. As Rawls emphasizes, having fewer educational or employment
opportunities also decreases the likelihood of an individual fully developing her talents or
professional skills. (The white male Ph.D.s who have been shunted to the periphery of
academia, e.g., can speak to the frustration entailed by such a disadvantage.) Arguing that
inegalitarianism is unjust in any event can only fail to comfort to those who have reason to
believe that they have been unfairly deprived of something whose value can not be
measured in dollars and cents. Furthermore, it is just false that most of the present day
victims of AA3 occupy privileged positions or are responsible for the injustice it aims to
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redress. Many have fewer advantages than some of its beneficiaries. Thus, neither of
Nagel's reasons warrants accepting AA3 as even a temporary measure.
Neither does an appeal to the value of diversity, integration, or racial/ethnic/gender
harmony. These social goods must not be purchased at the cost violating individual's rights.
It seems a mark against consequentialist theories that they would allow us to disregard this
expense in the pursuit of the "common good." Defending the Kantian framework of Rawls'
theory is beyond the scope of the present work. Suffice to say that the burden of proofs
seems here to lie with those who would permit inequality of opportunity (the elimination of
which was the original stated goal of many civil rights advocates) in the course of securing
the above goods.
III
Are there remedial measures besides AA1 or AA2 that one could accept in the original
position? As we have just seen, one therein would not opt to set aside a certain number of
coveted positions for the victims of injustice. But nothing that was said against that policy
would apply to remedial measures whose purpose is to insure that all aspirants to such
positions are well prepared to compete for them. Behind the veil of ignorance, one would
accept not only AA1 or AA2 but also any other remedial measure that would promote what
Rawls calls "pure procedural justice" (86).
A society exhibits pure procedural justice in case it utilizes a system of distributing its
primary goods such that the resulting allocation is fair whatever it turns out to be (87). Such
a system would be consonant with the two principles of justice (88).
Rawls further notes that a key element of a fair distribution system is "education for all,"
which "underwrite(s)" equality of opportunity (88). A just society, he contends, would
prepare its youth to meet the competitive demands of adulthood. I would add that, in the
case of victims of injustice, the required education would have to address not only their
academic deficiencies but also help establish the self-esteem they are likely lacking.
Obviously, these measures would have to go beyond providing such persons with the
educational opportunities all others enjoy, since they are unlikely to be able to take
advantage of them sans a certain amount of remedialization. The victims of injustice, in
other words, are owed more in the way of education than that which fair equality of
opportunity would require were no such persons to exist.
That some individuals are unable or unwilling to take advantage of educational
opportunities does not cancel a society's obligation to make them universally available. The
fact that schooling fails to improve the prospects of some persons should not weaken our
resolve to educate those who would thereby benefit. From the perspective of the original
position, one could only arrange access to all of the opportunities of which one might turn
out to be capable of taking advantage. One could not attempt to tailor one's options to suit a
particular set of abilities. Moreover, that educational efforts are going to be wasted on a
particular individual is not something that can be predicted. Each person is thus owed the
opportunity to benefit, to the extent to which she is capable, from a good education.
Thus, in addition to AA1 and AA2, a Rawlsian society would compensate the victims of
injustice be redoubling its efforts at providing high quality, universal primary and
secondary schooling. To someone in the original position this endeavor would appear
highly desirable: since therein it is not known who would be educationally disadvantaged
but for its existence. It would be understood as a safeguard against historical injustices such
as racism, sexism, religious bigotry, homophobia, and poverty determining anyone's share
of the primary goods, leaving nature and one's efforts as the deciding factors. Rawlsian
affirmative action would begin at the schoolhouse.
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